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11. Introduction
In the U.S.A numerous subprime banks are presently failing. Subprime banking represents a
novel and rapidly growing segment of the mortgage market that channels loans to those
borrowers, who fail to meet credit quality requirements in the standard mortgage market. This
paper poses the question of whether banks, for example subprime banks, gamble with the
future value of collateral (house property). Borrowers of the subprime banks are risky clients
but  their  loans  are  secured  by  house  property.  Even  when a  borrower  cannot  earn  sufficient
income to repay the loan, the bank does not face a loan loss if the value of house property
appreciates during the loan period so that it covers the loan repayment. More precisely, most
borrowers are able to earn sufficient income to repay their loans and thus they can keep their
houses. A few borrowers are unable to earn income, but the bank can seize the collateral
(house  property)  and  in  this  way  extract  the  whole  loan  repayment.   As  a  result,  each  loan
yields the repayment and the bank makes handsome profits if the collateral value appreciates.
If the value of the house property depreciates, the bank fails, since the defaulted loans yield
low income to the bank due to the depreciated collateral value. Consequently, the banks are
de facto gambling with the future value of house property.
According to the classic banking theory, collateral reduces bank risk. Even when
a borrower has insufficient income to repay his loan, the bank can seize the collateral (Bester,
1985). This paper does not deny that collateral may reduce bank risk. Yet, the positive effects
of collateral are challenged using two models, in which the fluctuating value of collateral
generates the moral hazard problem between banks and the bank regulator. In Section 3, loans
are secured by outside collateral. Its future value is uncertain, which tempts banks to gamble
with the collateral. Banks refrain from the costly efforts of borrower evaluation, but lending
decisions  are  based  on  the  collateral.  If  the  collateral  value  is  high  at  a  later  date,  the  bank
2makes a profit. If the collateral value depreciates, the bank fails and the bank regulator, who
runs the deposit insurance scheme, has to pay the costs of excessive risk taking. Section 4
models the example of a subprime bank.1 The moral hazard effect is shown to be strengthened
when outside collateral is replaced with inside collateral, which is funded with the loan capital.
The paper is related to abundant research on moral hazard in banking and
analysis on collateral.2 When Bester (1985) investigates how collateral affects the risk of a
single loan, the question to be answered is: how does collateral influence bank risk at the
aggregate level. Does collateral alleviate or worsen the bank’s risk of failure? We are
primarily interested in investigating the circumstances, if any, in which collateral can fuel the
moral hazard effects of deposit insurance. As mentioned above, we are able to observe these
circumstances. Our findings are rather consistent with existing empirical evidence which is
surveyed in Section 2. Consequently, our paper proposes a theory which explains why
banking crises are connected with fluctuations in real estate markets.
Section 2 reviews the empirical evidence. Section 3 examines how outside
collateral may generate the moral hazard problem. Section 4 finds the same result using inside
collateral, and Section 5 concludes.
1 For details on subprime lending see Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006).
2 For moral hazard in banking see Matutes and Vives (2000), Blum (2002), Chiesa (2001), Niinimäki (2001),
Repullo (2004), Decamps et al. (2004), Freixas et al. (2004), Jeitschko and Jeung (2005), Kopecky and
VanHoose (2006), Lepetit et al. (2008), Kang and Liu (2008) as well as Nikitin and Smith (2008).
32. Empirical evidence
This section surveys the empirical evidence on collateral and banking crises.
Observation 1. The ratio of collateral to loan size is high. According to Binks et
al. (1993) and de Meza and Southey (1996), in the U.S.A the ratio of collateral to loan is, on
average, 1:2 and in the Great Britain exceeds unity for 85% of loans.
Observation 2. A major portion of collateral consists of real estate. According
to Borio’s (1996) observations, the portion of loans secured by real estate collateral varies in
different countries: 59% in Great Britain, 56% in Canada and 66% in United States.
Observation 3. Collateral value, particularly the value of real estate, fluctuates
substantially. In Stockholm inflation-adjusted property prices rose rapidly in the late 1980s,
rising to 450% of the level at the beginning of the decade. From 1989 to 1993, inflation-
adjusted property prices depreciated to less than the 1982 level (Herring and Wachter, 1999).
In Japan, commercial property prices rose over 300% during the 1980s, but declined again to
the initial level over the next five years (Hilbers et al., 2001).
Observation 4. Banking crises are commonly preceded by a depreciation in the
value of real estate. Herring and Wachter (1999, p. 2), for instance, document the following:
“One striking feature of the current Asian financial crisis is that the most seriously affected countries first
experienced a collapse in property prices and a consequent weakening of their banking systems before an
exchange rate crisis.”
Zhu’s (2003) empirical study focuses on the level of banking profitability and loan loss
provisions during the upswing and downward phases of real estate markets. On average, bank
profits  were  almost  halved,  and  loan  loss  provisions  nearly  doubled  when  the  value  of  real
estate depreciates. In the FDIC ’s extensive empirical analysis on the Savings and Loan Crisis,
4Hanc (1998. p. 19-24) offers the following conclusions: “Commercial and real estate markets
in particular deserve attention because boom and bust activity in these markets was one of the
main causes of losses at both failed and surviving banks.”
Observation 5. There is abundant evidence to suggest that lending decisions are
often based on collateral and that this lending method leads to crises. As to the Savings and
Loan Crisis in U.S.A, Freund et al. (1998, p. 155) document:
“Traditionally, decisions to extend loans that are collateralized by commercial real estate property are
evaluated by lenders primarily on the borrowers’ ability to generate earnings from the investment
sufficient to cover the existing debt payments. This is a fundamental tenet of the lending function. As a
backup source of security, lenders evaluate the worth of investment property as potential collateral to
cover the loan value in the case of default by the borrower. Starting in the late 1970s and continuing for
the most of the following decade, examiners observed that lenders loosened loan terms relating to debt-
service coverage and placed relatively more emphasis on the value of the collateral in making funding
decisions. This change in loan procedures was based primarily on the assumption that real estate values
(collateral values) would continue to rise in the future as they had in the recent past. …. When the real
estate markets collapsed starting in the late 1980s, many lenders discovered that collateral values were
often insufficient to cover existing loan losses”.
Hilbers et al. (2001, p. 14) underline that before the banking crises in Finland and Sweden
“lending decisions relied primary on availability of collateral rather than cash flow
evaluations.” As regards to the Asian crisis, Collyns and Senhadji (2005, p. 112) document:
“Typically, techniques for credit assessment by banks were weakly developed, and banks
tended to rely heavily on property collateral (and, to some extent, equity collateral) in making
loan decisions.” The banking crisis in Japan was preceded by similar lending policy. Herring
and Wachter (1999, p.40) report: “Some banks apparently tended to rely on the rising value of
land rather than rigorous credit analysis in underwriting loans.”
53. Outside collateral
3.1. Economy
Consider a risk-neutral economy with banks, borrowers (= entrepreneurs ) and a bank
regulator. Banks and entrepreneurs maximize their expected returns whereas the regulator
runs a deposit insurance scheme and supervises banks.3 Each entrepreneur can undertake an
investment project, which requires a unit of input capital. Since an entrepreneur has no capital
of his own, he needs to seek financing from a bank. Bank size is 1 and it has no capital of its
own. The bank funds its lending by attracting deposits at the interest rate of the economy, r .
As is common in this type of model, it is assumed that the regulator cannot directly observe
bank risk. He can, however, observe loan collateral as well as the loan interest rates and he
knows the characteristics of the economy. As a result, he can anticipate accurately whether
the economic environment is such that the moral hazard problem appears or does not appear.
The  economy  has  two  types  of  entrepreneurs:  good  and  bad.  The  project  of  a
good entrepreneur – a good project – succeeds with probability G?  producing Y  units. The
project of a bad entrepreneur – a bad project - succeeds with probability B?  producing
Y units. If unsuccessful, the projects produce no output. In the economy, the share of good
entrepreneurs is g , and the rest of the entrepreneurs, g?1 ,  are  bad.  On  average  a  loan
succeeds with probability
BG ggs ?? )1( ??? .                  (1)
3 Deposits are insured in order to eliminate bank runs (see Niinimäki, 2003).
6It is assumed that an average project is unprofitable
.rYs ?                 (2)
As a result, a loan to an unknown borrower is unprofitable. Unfortunately, the type of an
entrepreneur is unobservable to outsiders. Only banks can separate good and bad
entrepreneurs by monitoring them. Monitoring incurs non-monetary costs m  and it is
assumed to be socially valuable. More precisely, the following assumption is made
g
mrYG ??? .                  (3)
This and (2) together provide
))(1( Yrgm B???? .                                        (4)
It  is  necessary  to  detail  (3)  and  (4).  Let  us  begin  from  (4).  Since 0?m , bad projects have
negative NPV, rYB ?? . No loan should be granted to bad entrepreneurs. In addition, (4)
informs that the costs of monitoring a loan applicant are smaller than the social  costs of the
bad project. Let us now turn to (3). A monitoring bank contacts loan applicants until the
measure of contacted good entrepreneurs is 1 and finances their projects. Before that, the bank
has faced g1 loan applicants. Hence, the total costs of monitoring amount to gm . Given (3),
the NPV of a good project covers the costs of monitoring and the loan interest rate. It is
socially optimal to monitor loan applicants, separate good and bad entrepreneurs and finance
the projects of good entrepreneurs.
7The task of monitoring is delegated to banks that operate under limited liability.
Unfortunately, since monitoring incurs costs and since it is unobservable to outsiders, banks
have the temptation to neglect it. This generates the problem of moral hazard between banks
and the regulator. The banks maximize their expected profits and exert effort in monitoring
only if it is at least as profitable as the non-monitoring strategy.
In the first best arrangement, the entrepreneur type (good or bad) would be
observable and the hidden information problem could be avoided. This alternative is
unachievable in the model. In the second best arrangement, the entrepreneurs are separated
using bank monitoring. Monitoring incurs costs but the most devastating arrangement,
investment with bad projects, is avoided. If the bank’s choice of action (monitoring, non-
monitoring) were contractible, the loans would be monitored by banks. Yet, monitoring is
assumed to be unobservable and it is not possible to commit to a contract that forces banks to
monitor. Banks need to be motivated to monitor. For brevity, few assumptions are made.
Assumption 1. A monitoring bank is risk free.
In addition, a monitoring bank makes zero profits because of perfect competition. This makes
it easy to examine moral hazard. A bank neglects monitoring if the non-monitoring strategy
yields some degree of profit to it.
According to banking theory, collateral can be used to screen loan applicants
(e.g. Bester, 1985). In more complicated models, the probability of project success depends
on the amount of collateral and the monitoring activity. In this paper, the role of collateral is
strongly simplified. Collateral is needed in the model, of course, since the effects of collateral
are explored. In addition, to explore the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance, banks have
an  active  monitoring  role.  It  would  be  possible  to  investigate  the  moral  hazard  effects  of
8collateral by constructing a model in which the role of collateral is more detailed. Yet, for
simplification the role of the collateral is modelled in an elementary way; collateral affects
only the loan interest rate. This simple role is sufficient to show that in some cases collateral
fuels moral hazard.4
More precisely, borrowers (=entrepreneurs) can influence the loan interest rate
by pledging C  units outside collateral that consists of real estate in the bank’s neighbourhood.
The initial amount of collateral is assumed to be fixed at the beginning of the period; that is,
each borrower pledges the same amount of collateral, C . The future value of collateral at the
end of the period is uncertain. With probability h , the collateral value appreciates during the
loan period and it is C?  units at the end the period. With probability h?1  the collateral value
depreciates and is C?  units at the end of the period, .1 ?? ??  Thus, the expected value of
collateral, EC , is
? ?ChhC E ?? )1( ??? .                                      (5)
In addition, the initial value of collateral, C , is equal to its expected value, EC .  Therefore,
collateral is priced correctly.
4 In the following, the initial amount of collateral is fixed. It is possible to assume that this fixed amount of
collateral is determined by a rule that is not modelled. For example, even a good entrepreneur will take the loan
capital and run with it if the loan is not secured by outside collateral. Suppose that this “take the money and run”
option creates private benefits B to a borrower. When the borrower pledges outside collateral so that C=B, the
run is unprofitable. If the borrower runs, he loses the collateral. Hence, the initial amount of collateral is
determined by the “take the money and run option”. In the following we examine how this amount of collateral
affects moral hazard in banking.
9The shares of good and bad borrowers, g  and g?1 , are known in the economy
and in the bank’s portfolio of customers. A certain share of the financed good projects, G? ,
and bad projects, B? , is successful both in the economy and in a loan portfolio. Thus, only
the future value of collateral is uncertain. Finally, we make the following assumption
Assumption 2. The bank’s income from collateral is, at a maximum, equivalent to the loan
repayment.
Section 3 presents a model in which moral hazard is avoided in the absence of outside
collateral but when the loans are secured by outside collateral, the moral hazard problem may
appear.  It  may  be  a  bit  puzzling  that  adding  risk  mitigation  (here  in  the  form  of  collateral)
should increase the volatility of loan returns! How can adding insurance to a loan make the
loan riskier? To see this, note that the bank’s income consists of two elements
i. Successful loans yield loan repayments
ii. Unsuccessful loans yield collateral
Thanks to perfect diversification, the future share of successful loans in the bank’s loan
portfolio is certain. Hence, the bank’s income from successful loans (i.) is also (almost)
certain. On the other hand, when the future value of collateral fluctuates, the bank’s collateral
proceeds from unsuccessful loans (ii.) are risky. If this effect is sufficiently strong, the
introduction of collateral may accelerate the volatility of bank returns. Due to the accelerated
volatility, the moral hazard behaviour may be profitable. By investing in monitoring, the bank
earns zero returns due to perfect competition. Without monitoring, the bank avoids the costs
of monitoring, but the future share of successful loans is relatively small. Yet, if the collateral
value appreciates during the loan period, the unsuccessful loans yield relatively high collateral
proceeds, thereby making the bank profitable. If the collateral value depreciates, the bank fails.
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Since  the  expected  returns  from  the  non-monitoring  strategy  are  positive  to  the  bank,  it
optimally neglects monitoring and the moral hazard problem is present.
Again, we aim to show that the introduction of collateral may generate the
problem of moral hazard.5 To show this, we explore three scenarios: 1.) Bank returns with
monitoring; 2.) Bank returns without collateral and without monitoring; 3.) Bank returns with
collateral  and  without  monitoring.  Thanks  to  perfect  competition,  scenario  1  yields  zero
returns. This is shown in subsection 3.2. Subsection 3.3 investigates banking without
monitoring. First, it is demonstrated that a non-monitoring bank fails in the absence of loan
collateral. Thus, moral hazard is avoided in the absence of collateral (scenario 1 is more
profitable than scenario 2). Then we indicate that a non-monitoring bank may earn positive
expected returns when the loans are secured by collateral (scenario 3 is more profitable than
scenario 1). The moral hazard problem appears.
3.2. Bank returns under monitoring
Since the banking sector is perfectly competitive, the loan interest rate is at a level that yields
zero returns to the bank that exerts effort in monitoring
? ?
g
mrChRChMinR GGG ??????? ????? )1)(1(,)1( .                                      (6)
5 Fundamentally, the deposit insurance option creates the moral hazard problem. Since collateral is now the one
and only instrument of risk taking, we stress the effects of collateral by stating that collateral fuels moral hazard.
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The L.H.S indicates the expected bank income whereas the costs of banking are on the R.H.S.
On the L.H.S RG?  describes the loan interest income from successful loans. Since the share
of successful loans is certain, the loan interest income is also certain. The second term shows
the bank’s collateral proceeds from unsuccessful loans when the collateral value appreciates
during the loan period. If RC ?? ,  the  collateral  value  exceeds  the  loan  repayment  and  the
unsuccessful loans also yield the entire repayment, R , to the bank. A borrower can keep the
surplus, 0?? RC? . If RC ?? , the collateral value does not cover the loan repayment and
the bank can seize the entire collateral. The third term in (6) displays the bank’s collateral
proceeds from unsuccessful loans when the collateral value depreciates during the loan period.
It is known that RC ?? .6  The R.H.S reveals that the income is used to pay interest on
deposits and to cover the costs of monitoring. Depending on whether RC ??  or RC ?? , two
alternative loan interest rates can be solved from (6)
RCwhen
C
g
mr
R
G
G
?
???
? ??
?
,
)1(
.               (7.i)
RCwhen
h
Ch
g
mr
R
GG
G
???
????
? ???
??
,
)1(
)1)(1(
.               (7.ii)
Both loan interest rates are declining in collateral. Borrowers are willing to pledge collateral
only if it reduces the loan interest rates. To simplify the model, we make the following
assumption that is based on Assumption 1.
Assumption 1’. rCR GG ??? ??? )1( , which makes a monitoring bank risk free.
6 If rC ??  , the participation constraint of bad borrowers is not satisfied (see Lemma 2).
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Assumption 1’ together with (6) and (7) ensures that a monitoring bank earns zero returns. A
bank neglects monitoring if the non-monitoring strategy yields positive expected returns for it.
3.3. Bank returns in the absence of monitoring
Consider a representative bank that neglects monitoring. The bank charges the very same
interest on loans as the monitoring banks. Thus, the loan interest rate does not reveal the non-
monitoring strategy. Since the bank does not monitor loan applicants, it finances their projects
in the order of appearance. As a result, the borrowers consist of good and bad entrepreneurs.
Their shares are g  and g?1 . Since a certain share of good projects and bad projects succeed,
the future share of successful loans is also certain, BG ggs ?? )1( ??? .
We aim to show that the fluctuating value of collateral may cause the moral
hazard problem. To begin, we show that moral hazard is avoided in the absence of collateral.
Lemma 1. When borrowers pledge no collateral, a bank fails if it neglects monitoring. The
moral hazard problem is avoided.
Proof. Without monitoring, the bank returns are rsR ?)0( . Inserting )0(R  from (7.i) into
rsR ?)0(  provides ? ? 0))(1()0()1( ???????? YrgmRrgm BB ??  . Q.E.D
The intuition is obvious. Given the law of large numbers, the bank has Gg? successful loans
that are allocated to good entrepreneurs. The loans yield total profit m .  The  rest  of  the
loans, g?1 , are channelled to bad entrepreneurs and they yield total loss ? ?)0()1( Rrg B??? .
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Since monitoring has positive social value, recall (4), the losses from bad borrowers exceed
the profits from good borrowers and the bank fails.
Next we will show that moral hazard may appear when the loans are secured by
collateral. Two scenarios occur depending on the volatility of the collateral value. We will
first explore scenario RC ?? and then scenario RC ?? .
3.3.1. Case RC ??
This subsection reveals that the non-monitoring strategy may be profitable when RC ??
(more precisely ? ?)1()( GGgmrC ?? ???? ). The inequality means that even when
the collateral value appreciates during the loan period, the appreciation is so moderate that the
collateral value does not cover the loan repayment. If a borrower cannot repay his loan, the
bank can seize the entire collateral.
Bad entrepreneurs seek a bank loan only if their participation constraint is
satisfied. The following Lemma is derived in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. There exists such a screening level of collateral, 1ScreenC , that bad borrowers will
not seek a bank loan if 1ScreenCC ?  , )()(1 BGGBScreen gmrYC ???? ???? .
Thus, when the initial amount of collateral exceeds 1ScreenC  ,  only  good  entrepreneurs  seek  a
loan. In the following, we assume that borrowers do not have sufficient collateral. That is, the
analysis focuses on cases ? ?1,0 ScreenCC ? . As a result, a bad entrepreneur optimally seeks a
loan, because it is profitable for him
14
? ? 0)1()( ???? CCRY BB ?? .                                      (8)
The non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable when the collateral value is certain.
Lemma 3. If the collateral value is certain, a non-monitoring bank fails.
Proof:  The bank earns rCsCsR ??? )1()(  . Inserting )(CR from (7.i) into this provides
? ? ? ?CRYgrYgm BBB )1()()1()1( ??? ???????? .                 (9)
Given (4), the sum of the first two terms is negative. Given (8), the third term is negative.
Hence, (9) is negative and the bank fails. Q.E.D
So far we have observed that moral hazard is avoided without collateral (Lemma
1) and when the collateral value is certain (Lemma 3). It is time to show that moral hazard
may appear when the future value of collateral is uncertain. The initial amount of collateral
satisfies ? ?1,0 ScreenCC ? and the expected bank returns amount to
? ? ? ?0,)1()()1(0,)1()()( rCsCRsMaxhrCsCRsMaxhCB ????????? ??? .       (10)
Here the limited liability option is expressed in detail: bank returns cannot be negative. The
first term describes bank returns when the collateral value appreciates during the loan period
and the second term represents the bank returns when the collateral value depreciates during
the loan period. Note that the shares of successful and unsuccessful loans are certain, s  and
s?1 . Given Lemma 3 and CC ?? , the second term is zero. Thus, (10) can be expressed as
15
? ?0,))(1()()( rCsrRsMaxhCB ????? ?? .                (11)
It is known that rCR ?)(  ( see (7.i)). When rC ?? , the collateral proceeds from
unsuccessful loans also cover the costs of banking. Thus, at least when rC ?? , (11) is
positive. The bank profits when the collateral value appreciates. Hence, the expected profits
from  the  non-monitoring  strategy  are  positive.  Since  the  monitoring  strategy  yields  zero
returns, the bank optimally neglects monitoring. The moral hazard problem appears.
It  is  necessary  to  find  out  exactly  when  moral  hazard  appears.  Substituting
)(CR  from (7.i) into (11) provides rewritten expected bank returns
? ?
G
GBGBG
B
Csg
g
smrg
C ?
??????
?
)1()1())(1()()1(
)(
??????????
? .           (12)
It is possible to see three facts: i.) The non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable without
collateral (Lemma 1); ii.) The returns from the non-monitoring strategy are increasing in
collateral (see (12)); iii.) When the volatility of the collateral value is sufficient, rCScreen ?1? ,
the non-monitoring strategy is profitable (recall (11)). Given i. – iii., when rCScreen ?1? , there
is always such a minimum amount of collateral, 1ScreenMin CC ? , that the bank returns are zero,
0)( ?MinB C? . Even when the volatility of the collateral value is smaller, rCScreen ?1? , it may
be possible to have such a minimum amount of collateral, 1ScreenMin CC ? , that the bank returns
are zero, 0)( ?MinB C?  (see (11)). Only if 0)( 1 ?ScreenB C? , the volatility of the collateral value
is so small that the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable. A conclusion follows.
16
Lemma 4. When the volatility of the collateral value is sufficient, there exists such a minimum
amount of collateral, MinC ,  that expected bank returns are zero without monitoring ,
0)( ?MinB C? . If the initial amount of collateral is small, MinCC ? ,  moral hazard is avoided.
If the initial amount of collateral is at the middle level, 1ScreenMin CCC ?? , moral hazard
appears. If the initial amount of collateral is large, 1ScreenCC ? , moral hazard is avoided,
because the participation constraint of bad entrepreneurs is not satisfied. When the volatility
of the collateral value is insufficient, the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable at each level
of collateral, 0)( 1 ?ScreenB C? .
Consequently, the moral hazard problem may appear if the initial amount of collateral is large
enough and if the volatility of the collateral value is sufficient. Then, the future value of
collateral, C? , can be so high that even the defaulted loans yield relatively high collateral
proceeds to the bank, thereby making the bank returns positive.
So far the amount of collateral has been fixed. Suppose that it can be decided by
the bank. Given (12), the bank returns are increasing in C. Under constraint )(CRC ?? , the
returns are maximized when C?  approaches towards )(CR  without limit, )(CRC ?? . Given
)(CRC ??  and (7.i), it is possible to solve the optimal amount of collateral.
Lemma 5. If a bank can choose the amount of collateral, the optimal amount is ?*C?
*)(CR  or ? ?)1()(* GGgmrC ?? ???? , when the participation constraint is
satisfied, 1* SreenCC ? . If 1* SreenCC ? , the optimal amount of collateral is 1SreenC .
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3.3.2. Case RC ??
This subsection indicates that the non-monitoring strategy is profitable with certainty when
RC ?? . When the collateral value appreciates, it is so high, C? , that it covers the total loan
interest payment, R . As a result, the bank receives the loan repayment, R  , even when the
financed project fails, whereas the borrower can keep surplus, RC ?? .
Again, if the collateral requirement is large, the participation constraint of bad
entrepreneurs is not satisfied. The following lemma is derived in Appendix B.
Lemma 6. When )(CRC ?? , there is such a screening level of collateral, 2ScreenC , that bad
entrepreneurs will not borrow if 2ScreenCC ? , where
? ? ? ?
)()1(
)1()()1(
2
BG
BBBGG
Screen h
h
g
mrYh
C ???
?????
??
??????
? .             (13)
Therefore, if each entrepreneur has more than 2ScreenC units of collateral, it is possible to screen
bad borrowers from the loan market. We assume that borrowers have less collateral,
? ?2,0 ScreenCC? . The collateral value fluctuates and the expected bank returns are
? ? ? ?0,)1()1(0,),()1( rCsRsMaxhrRCMínsRsMaxh ???????? ?? .              (14)
The first term reveals bank returns when the future value of collateral is high and the second
term indicates the same when the collateral value is low. The second term is zero: the bank
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fails when the collateral value depreciates (Lemma 3 and CC ?? ). Given
rRRCMin ??),(? , the expected bank returns can be restated as ? ? .0)( ?? rCRh  The
non-monitoring strategy is profitable and the moral hazard problem appears.
Lemma 7. When )(CRC ?? , the moral hazard problem is always present if the participation
constraint of bad entrepreneurs is satisfied, 2ScreenCC ?  .
Finally, suppose that the bank can decide the initial amount of collateral. What is the optimal
amount? Inserting the loan interest rate from (7.ii) into 0)( ?? rCR   provides bank returns
h
Crh
GG
g
m
G
)1(
))(1)(1(
??
??
??
????
,                (15)
which are decreasing in C . The bank optimally reduces the amount of collateral to the lower
limit )(CRC ?? .  Therefore,  the  optimal  amount  of  collateral  is  the  same  as  in  the  case
)(CRC ?? and is expressed in Lemma 5. This section can be summed up as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the initial amount of outside collateral satisfies the participation
constraint of bad borrowers. If the collateral value can appreciate sufficiently ( at least when
rC ?? ), the moral hazard problem is present. A bank optimally grants loans against
collateral without monitoring loan applicants and relies on the rising collateral value. If the
future value of collateral is high, unsuccessful loans yield high collateral proceeds for the
bank, which enjoys profits. If not, the bank fails.
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According to Proposition 1, the banking sector is profitable if the collateral value appreciates,
but if it depreciates, a banking crisis occurs.
Collateral requirements can be utilized to eliminate moral hazard. Given Lemma
4, moral hazard appears only if the initial amount of collateral is at the middle level. If loan
applicants possess plenty of collateral, the regulator can stipulate banks to lend only against a
sufficient amount of collateral so that bad entrepreneurs can be screened from the loan market
(Lemmas 2 and 6). If the amount of collateral is very large, loans are risk-free. Unfortunately,
it is unlikely that loan applicants have sufficient collateral. Then, the regulator might follow
an opposite strategy by setting an upper limit to collateral so that banks can not gamble with it
(Lemma 4, MinCC ? ). However, this is impossible when collateral is needed to control
borrowers (footnote 4). Therefore, it is possible that moral hazard cannot be eliminated.
In this section, we have solved the unique equilibrium loan interest rate for
monitoring banks under the competitive assumption of zero expected profits, R . Thereafter,
we have explored a representative non-monitoring bank that charges the very same interest on
loans as monitoring banks, and demonstrated that the non-monitoring bank enjoys positive
expected profits in the specific economic environment (at least when rC ?? ). In equilibrium,
all banks behave identically and neglect monitoring. As a result, the original loan interest rate,
R , cannot persist in equilibrium. All banks will become non-monitoring banks and the
equilibrium loan interest rate will drop below R  owing to perfect competition. However, it is
known from (2) that an average project is unproductive without monitoring. As a result,
banking cannot be profitable because deposit insurance is priced correctly (recall that under
monitoring the deposit insurance premium is zero since banks are risk-free). A rational
regulator anticipates correctly that in the specific economic environment all banks would
neglect monitoring and the regulator should bear the costs of the gamble. Hence, the regulator
cannot grant banking licenses at all. The moral hazard problem is so severe that no banks can
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be established. Banks can be established only when the volatility of the collateral value is so
low that the moral hazard problem does not appear.
Corollary 1. When the economic environment is such that the moral hazard problem is
present, no banks can be established.
3.4. Discussion
In Diamond (1984), a bank operates as a delegated monitor. The moral hazard problem
between the bank and its depositors is avoided since the number of borrowers is huge and the
risks and returns of their projects are independent. Thanks to the law of large numbers, the
loan portfolio is perfectly diversified. Thus, depositors can rely on the bank being safe.
This section follows the vision of Diamond (1984). Thanks to the law of large
numbers, the share of successful loans is certain. In the absence of monitoring, the share of
successful loans is so small that the bank fails. Thus, in the absence of collateral the bank is
motivated  to  monitor  borrowers  and  it  is  risk-free  because  bad  borrowers  are  screened  out.
Collateral offers another potential screening mechanism because, if set high enough, bad
borrowers  would  not  participate  in  the  loan  market.  However,  collateral  may  also  induce
moral hazard behaviour. Since the value of collateral is the same, low or high, collateral offers
the  bank  a  correlated  risk  with  which  it  can  gamble.  When  the  future  value  of  collateral  is
sufficiently high, RC ??  , it is insignificant for the bank whether or not a borrower is able to
earn income and thereby repay his loan. In both cases the bank receives the same payment,
RC ?? . The future value of collateral is crucial. If it is high, the bank enjoys handsome
profits, but if it is low, the bank fails.
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4. Inside collateral
4.1. Economy
In section 3, collateral consisted of outside collateral. Outside collateral refers to cases where
the borrower pledges assets not used in the project. In this section collateral consists of inside
collateral, which is funded with loan capital. Since this type of collateral incurs no costs to the
borrower, his participation constraint is satisfied. The findings of this section are similar to the
findings of the previous section.
Inside collateral, which is funded with loan capital, is common in mortgage
lending. To emphasize this, the model is updated somewhat. Consider a homebuyer who has
no capital of his own and seeks for a bank loan. The loan size is 1 unit and it is used at the
beginning of the period to purchase a house, which is pledged as collateral, 1?C  unit. The
value of the house fluctuates during the loan period. More precisely, at the beginning of the
period, the value is 1?C  units, but at the end of the period it is either C?  units (with
probability h ) or C?  units (with probability h?1 ), ?? ?? 1  .  Again, the current value of
the house is equal to its expected value. Banks maintain no equity capital and they fund loans
by attracting deposits at the interest rate of the economy, r . The bank size is 1 and the
banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
The economy has two types of homebuyers: good and bad. With probability G? ,
a good homebuyer can earn income Y , but with probability G??1  he earns nothing. A bad
homebuyer can earn Y  with probability B? , whereas with probability B??1  he in unable to
earn anything, BG ?? ? .  The  share  of  good  homebuyers  is g ,  while  the  rest  of  the
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homebuyers, g?1 , are bad. Thus, an average homebuyer succeeds to earn Y  with probability
BG ggs ?? )1( ??? . A loan to an average homebuyer is assumed to be unprofitable
rCYs ?? ,              (16)
where 1?C . That is, the expected earnings of an homebuyer, Ys , and the expected value of
his house property at the end of the period, C , do not cover the interest rate of the economy,
r . A loan to a good homebuyer is assumed to have clearly positive NPV
g
mrCYG ????  .               (17)
Now (16) and (17) together provide
))(1( CYrgm B ???? ? .               (18)
In addition, it is assumed that
g
mrY ?? .                (19)
It  is  possible  to  detail  (17)-(19)  as  follows.  The  type  of  a  homebuyer  is  private  information
and thus unobservable to outsiders. Only banks can separate good and bad homebuyers by
monitoring them. Monitoring incurs a nonmonetary cost, m , to the bank. A monitoring bank
meets loan applicants until the measure of contacted good homebuyers is 1 . Before that the
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bank needs to contact g1 loan applicants. Thus, the total costs of monitoring amount to gm
and the costs of a loan add up to gmr ? . Now (19) ensures that a homebuyer (good or bad)
who succeeds in earning income Y  is able to repay his loan and thus keep his house.
According to (18), no loan should be granted to a bad homebuyer. The relatively large share
of bad homebuyers and the negative NPV of their loans induce so severe expected losses to
lenders that it is socially productive to monitor loan applicants in order to separate good and
bad homebuyers. That is, the non-monetary costs of monitoring a loan applicant, m  units, is
smaller than the expected losses from a bad project, ))(1( CYrg B ??? ? . Besides, (17)
indicates that a loan to a good homebuyer is clearly profitable. The good homebuyer’s
expected wealth covers both the interest rate and the costs of monitoring. The task of
monitoring is delegated to banks. To investigate moral hazard, it is necessary to examine bank
returns under monitoring (subsection 4.2) and in the absence of monitoring (subsection 4.3).
4.2. Bank returns with monitoring
Although the economy is different than in Section 3, the models are almost identical. The loan
interest  rate,  for  example,  can  again  be  solved  from  (6).  Additionally,  (7)  displays  the  loan
interest rates, whereas Assumption 1’ ensures that a monitoring bank is risk-free and enjoys
zero returns. Two main differences to Section 3 exist. First, since loans are secured by inside
collateral, which is purchased with loan capital, the borrowers’ participation constraints are
relaxed. Second, the initial amount of collateral is now fixed, 1?C . Since the monitoring
strategy yields zero returns, the bank neglects monitoring, if this strategy is profitable.
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4.3. Bank returns without monitoring
Assume that a representative bank neglects monitoring. The decision is unobservable to the
regulator. The bank charges interest R  on  loans  so  that  the  loan  interest  rate  is  the  same as
under monitoring and it does not reveal the non-monitoring strategy. The bank grants loans to
applicants in the order of appearance. Thanks to the law of large numbers, the shares of good
and bad homebuyers in the loan portfolio are the same as in the economy, g  and g?1 . The
expected bank returns are the same as under outside collateral
? ? ? ? )20(.0,)1()()1(0,),()1()( rCsCRsMaxhrRCMinsRsMaxhCB ????????? ???
The first term expresses the returns under the high collateral value and the second term shows
the returns when the collateral value becomes low. We obtain the following result.
Lemma 8. If the collateral value is certain, the moral hazard problem disappears.
Proof. When 1?? ?? , (20) simplifies to )1()1( BB Rrgm ?? ????? . Given (18) this is
negative and thus the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable. Q.E.D
Assume now that  the  collateral  value  fluctuates.  The  second term in  (20)  is  zero  (Lemma 8
and 1?? ). Consider the first term. Two scenarios occur depending on whether RC ??  or
RC ?? . When RC ?? , (20) can be rewritten as 0)()1()( ????? rCsrRs ? . The first
part is positive, but the second part may be negative. At least when rC ?? , (20) is positive
but it can be positive even when rC ?? . When RC ?? , (20) simplifies to rR ?  which is
always true. A conclusion follows.
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Proposition 2.  With inside collateral that is funded with the loan capital, the moral hazard
problem arises, if the collateral value may appreciate sufficiently (at least when r?? ).
Assume that the value of house property (=collateral) appreciates. Then, unsuccessful loans
also yield relatively high income to the bank. If r?? , the collateral value is so high that the
bank is profitable. Most of all, if R?? , the collateral value is so high that each loan yields
the whole loan repayment, R  , to the bank. Now s   homebuyers are able to earn income,
repay  their  loans  and  thus  keep  their  houses.  The  rest  of  the  homebuyers  are  unable  to  earn
income, but the value of their house property has appreciated considerably during the loan
period. The house property, collateral, can be seized and liquidated by the bank. Since
R?? , the bank obtains the promised loan repayment, R , in total whereas each borrower
can keep surplus, R?? . Since every loan yields the same repayment, R , to the bank, the
share of successful loans, s , is rather insignificant for the bank. The appreciated value of
collateral is crucial.
Consider now scenario R?? . It is optimal for a bad entrepreneur to seek for a
bank loan even when 0?B? . Although the borrower cannot earn income and thus repay the
loan, he can keep surplus 0?? R? if the collateral value appreciates. It is easy to see that
the moral hazard problem is relatively likely to appear with inside collateral.
Lemma 9. The moral hazard problem is more likely to appear with inside collateral than with
outside collateral.
Proof: When 1?C , the moral hazard problem appears if ? ? 0),()1()( ????? rRMinsrRs ?
under  both  forms  of  collateral.  With  inside  collateral,  there  are  no  participation  constraints.
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With outside collateral the participation constraint may eliminate the case 1?C .  Thus, moral
hazard is a more severe problem under the terms of inside collateral. Q.E.D
Similar to Section 3, we have investigated a representative non-monitoring bank which
charges the very same interest on loans as monitoring banks, and demonstrated that the bank
may optimally neglect monitoring. In equilibrium all banks behave identically and neglect
monitoring. Thanks to perfect competition, the loan interest rate will drop below R . However,
we know from (16) that banking is unprofitable in the absence of monitoring when the deposit
insurance is priced correctly. Thus, the regulator – who rationally anticipates that in the
existing economic environment each bank would neglect monitoring – cannot grant banking
licenses at all. The moral hazard problem is so severe that no banks can be established. The
result is identical to Corollary 1.
5. Conclusions
This paper reviews scenarios in which collateral is used as a risk-taking instrument. A bank
refrains from the costly efforts of borrower evaluation, but lending decisions are based on the
collateral. If the collateral value is high later, the bank enjoys handsome profits because
unsuccessful loans yield high collateral proceeds. If the collateral value is low, the bank fails
because the collateral proceeds from unsuccessful loans are low. Consequently, banks are
willing to finance unproductive projects based on the assumption that collateral values would
later appreciate. This type of problem is most likely to appear when the collateral consists of
inside collateral which is funded with the loan capital.
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Appendix A: Lemma 2
Without collateral the expected returns of a bad borrower are ))0(( RYB ?? . Given (7.i), this
is  positive.  With  collateral,  the  returns  are CCRY BB )1())(( ?? ??? . Inserting the loan
interest rate from (7.i) into this gives ? ? ./)( GBGBBB CgmrY ?????? ???? We denote
this by ?  . It is easy to see that ? is decreasing in C . With full collateral, gmrR ?? ,
? simplifies to )( gmrYB ??? , which is negative. Thus, such a screening amount of
collateral, 1SreenC , gmrCScreen ??? 10 , exists that bad borrowers earn zero returns. Q.E.D
Appendix B: Lemma 6
When )(CRC ?? ,  the  expected  returns  of  a  bad  borrower  are ? ? ??? )()( CRYC BB ??
? ? CCRCh BB )1()()1( ?? ???? . The returns are positive when C  is sufficiently small
(however, )(CRC ?? ). Inserting loan interest rate from (7.ii) into )(CB?  gives
? ? ? ?
h
Chh
g
mrYh
GG
BGBBBGG
)1(
)()1()1()()1(
??
????????
??
?????????
.         (B.1)
(B.1) is decreasing in C  and negative when rC ?? . There is C  such that (B.1) is 0. Q.E.D
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